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How the United States Would Fight China

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How the United States Would Fight China

How the United States Would Fight China

Assesses the substantial risk of strategic defeat for Washington in any war with China.

This is a detailed analysis of how the United States intends to fight a war against the People's Republic of China and why it risks strategic defeat based on its doctrine, force structure and general 'way of war'. Franz-Stefan Gady contends that the US military's current approach to a potential war over Taiwan is flawed, relying heavily both on achieving rapid information superiority and on a decisive victory. This is unlikely to succeed, and may increase the risk of nuclear escalation between the world's only genuine superpowers.

A US-China war would more likely be characterised by prolonged attrition across multiple domains (cyber, space, air, sea and land) a conflict for which America's military and society are ill-prepared. The US also lacks a viable blueprint, the military forces or the industrial capacity for a long war of attrition. This deficiency stems from a military culture prioritising advanced technology over mass, and the lack of political will or public readiness for the sacrifices such a conflict would require.

Gady's research and analysis, both of the highest order, reveal the significant risk of strategic defeat for the United States in a potential conflict with China, whether in the 2020s or 2030s.

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How the United States Would Fight China—
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Assesses the substantial risk of strategic defeat for Washington in any war with China.

This is a detailed analysis of how the United States intends to fight a war against the People's Republic of China and why it risks strategic defeat based on its doctrine, force structure and general 'way of war'. Franz-Stefan Gady contends that the US military's current approach to a potential war over Taiwan is flawed, relying heavily both on achieving rapid information superiority and on a decisive victory. This is unlikely to succeed, and may increase the risk of nuclear escalation between the world's only genuine superpowers.

A US-China war would more likely be characterised by prolonged attrition across multiple domains (cyber, space, air, sea and land) a conflict for which America's military and society are ill-prepared. The US also lacks a viable blueprint, the military forces or the industrial capacity for a long war of attrition. This deficiency stems from a military culture prioritising advanced technology over mass, and the lack of political will or public readiness for the sacrifices such a conflict would require.

Gady's research and analysis, both of the highest order, reveal the significant risk of strategic defeat for the United States in a potential conflict with China, whether in the 2020s or 2030s.